Continuous quantity and unit; their centrality to measurement by Cooper, Gordon A. & Fisher, William P., Jr.
urn:nbn:de:gbv:ilm1-2011imeko-019:9 Joint International IMEKO TC1+ TC7+ TC13 Symposium 
August 31st September 2nd, 2011, Jena, Germany 
urn:nbn:de:gbv:ilm1-2011imeko:2 
 
 
 
Continuous quantity and unit; their centrality to measurement 
 
Gordon A Cooper1, William P Fisher2 
 
1Graduate School of Education, The University of Western Australia, Crawley, Western Australia, 
Australia 
2Graduate School of Education, University of California, Berkeley, California, 
United States of America 
 
 
Abstract  The Vocabulaire international de métrologie 
(3rd Edition) and the Système International d’Unités (8th 
Edition) between them elaborate three different 
measurement forms. Comparisons of these measurement 
forms leads, in some instances, to illogical conclusions 
regarding the relationships between number and unit that 
compromises the distinction between continuous quantity, 
ordered relationships and counts of entities. 
To resolve these observed anomalies, we propose 
consideration is given to amending any subsequent VIM (4th 
Edition) to include restoration of definitions of 
measurement, unit and quantity that preserves the unit as the 
standard of reference, as elaborated by James Clerk 
Maxwell. 
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1.  MEASUREMENT FORMS 
 
The three measurement forms promulgated by the 
Bureau International des Poids et Mesures are the: 
 
classical form [1], [2], wherein a standard of 
reference, called the unit [1 p 1], forms a ratio 
with the magnitude of a measurand sharing the 
same property of that unit [3 p 2]. 
 
ordinal quantity form [3 p 15], which is a 
measurement procedure wherein an ordering 
relationship can be established, but no unit 
exists [3 p 15 Note 1]. 
 
counting of entities form [4 pp 114-115] wherein 
a specified number of discrete entities compose 
the unit. 
 
These differing measurement forms appear to be 
the result of a change to the permissible standard of 
reference adopted by the VIM [3]. Using the 
formalism of Quantity Calculus [5], where symbols in 
braces { } are numbers and symbols in square brackets 
[ ] are units, we distinguish between {N}[U], the 
Classical measurement form, and other references 
made permissible in the VIM [3]. To distinguish these 
alternate references from [U], we use angle brackets 
 , which maintains a similar symbolism but preserves 
the integrity of Quantity Calculus [5]. In so doing, 
first we demonstrate how number and quantity can be 
made interchangeable in “ordinal quantity” and lead, 
for instance, to the illogical cm^cm or cm^9 or 9^cm. 
Second, we demonstrate that “ordinal quantity” is not 
falsifiable [6], a major tenet of science. Next, we 
compare measurement in the Classical form with the 
counting of entities. Berka [7] has distinguished 
between counting to determine an aggregate of entities 
as an ontological necessity, while “counting” to obtain 
the magnitude of a measurand is an epistemological 
auxiliary. Cooper and Humphry [9] have also argued 
the {N} of continuous quantity and the {N} of 
aggregates of entities are ontologically distinct. Where 
{N}[U] is a continuous quantity, {N} is a real 
number, and where for example {N}R mole, is a 
reference to an aggregate of discrete entities, then {N} 
is a natural number. 
Therefore, we suggest counting is not measuring, 
employing “ordinal quantity” is not measuring and the 
term “measure” and its derivatives be preserved for 
continuous quantity as demonstrated by Maxwell [1].  
We conclude by suggesting the subsequent VIM 
(4th Edition) give consideration to these issues to 
remove ambiguity and restore the distinctions between 
continuous quantity, ordered relationships and counts 
of entities. 
 
2.  THE CLASSICAL MEASUREMENT FORM 
 
Michell [2 p 358] observes that, “…measurement 
is properly defined as the estimation or discovery of 
the ratio of some magnitude of a quantitative attribute 
to a unit of the same attribute. It is invariably along 
such lines that measurement is, and always has been, 
defined in the physical sciences…” (emphasis in 
original). This accords with the Maxwell definition 
[1 p 1], where every  
 
…expression of a Quantity consists of two factors 
or components. One of these is the name of a cer-
tain known quantity of the same kind as the quan-
tity to be expressed, which is taken as a standard of 
reference. The other component is the number of 
times the standard is to be taken in order to make 
up the required quantity. The standard quantity is 
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Atoms 
 
Carbon          
 {N}R carbon atoms 
 
 
Oxygen          
 {N}R oxygen atoms 
 
Molecule 
 
 
Carbon dioxide   {N}R CO2 molecules 
technically called the Unit, and the number is 
called the Numerical Value of the quantity. 
 
However, the VIM [3 p 2] defines quantity as a 
 
 …property of a phenomenon, body, or substance, 
where the property has a magnitude that can be 
expressed as a number and a reference. 
 
To this a qualification is provided in NOTE 2, where a 
 
 …reference can be a measurement unit, a meas-
urement procedure, a reference material, or a 
combination of such (emphasis in original). 
 
In both the Maxwell and Michell definitions, only 
a unit of the same attribute can be the “standard of 
reference” but the VIM definition makes permissible 
three different “references”: 
(1) a unit, as classically defined. 
(2) an ordered relationship. 
(3) a count of discrete entities. 
Removing the stricture of the unit as the only permis-
sible expression accompanying the numerical compo-
nent of a quantity has created the additional measure-
ment forms, (2) and (3), above. We now elaborate the 
consequences of redefining quantity in this manner to 
permit non-unit alternatives in the expression of a 
quantity 
 
3.  QUANTITY CALCULUS AND THE 
EXPRESSION OF QUANTITY 
 
Using the formalism of Quantity Calculus [5], 
numbers are symbolised in {N} and units in [U]. 
Therefore, the standard of reference, together with its 
numerical component, can be exemplified by {10}[K]. 
To preserve the integrity of Quantity Calculus we 
symbolise ordered relationship and a count of entities 
(2and 3 above) as the reference R with a subscript to 
R to particularize a reference. For example, subjec-
tive level of pain as an exemplification of an ordered 
relationship [3 p 15], would be particularized as 
{5}R pain and a count of discrete entities may be 
particularized as {6}R mole. 
This symbolism is now employed to make clear 
the consequence of re-defining quantity from number 
and a unit to number and a reference. This re-
definition is exemplified in Figure 1 and Figure 2 by 
“Subjective level of abdominal pain on a scale from 
zero to (ten)” [3 p 15]. 
Let 5 metres be expressed as {5}[M] and 5 “pain” 
be expressed as {5}RPAIN, where R is the reference 
and the subscript PAIN particularises the reference. 
The {5}[M] is the ratio {5}[M]/[M], which means {5} 
is a real number. By contrast, {5}RPAIN is a subjec-
tive estimate based on categories of pain assumed to 
be order to which “numbers” have been assigned. 
In this last instance, the {5} is neither a real num-
ber nor a natural number. It is an ordering of pain con- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Ordered pain categories (after Bierie et al [6]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Pain categories (after Downie et al [7]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. The mole exemplified 
 
 
structed from the pain descriptor categories and would 
best be described as 5th RPAIN or 5
th Label of Pain. 
Such numbers are therefore numerals or labels and 
carry no information regarding magnitude of a quan-
tity. Further, such “ordinal quantity” cannot form an 
inverse relationship between its numerical component 
and its reference. This is only possible in the classical 
measurement form where, for example, {5}[M] can be 
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re-expressed as {500}[cm] or {5000}[mm]. It is the 
decimal number and decimal unit that permit this 
relationship, one that cannot be sustained by any “or-
dinal quantity”. 
Finally, the VIM [3 p 6] defines“…measurement 
unit (as a) real scalar quantity, defined and adopted 
by convention, with which any other quantity of the 
same kind can be compared to express the ratio of the 
two quantities as a number”. This definition makes 
clear that “ordinal quantity” cannot claim quantity 
status for its numerical component is neither “real” 
nor “scalar” and no ratio can be formed to express a 
number. 
These logical inconsistencies in the VIM [3] re-
quire attention to ensure “…there is no fundamental 
difference in the basic principles of measurement in 
physics, chemistry, laboratory medicine, biology, or 
engineering.” 
 
4.  S. S. STEVENS AND THE ASSIGNING OF 
NUMERALS - ORDINAL QUANTITY 
 
The VIM includes a quantity named as “ordinal 
quantity” (3  p. 15), and defined as 
 
…..a conventional measurement procedure, for 
which a total ordering relation can be established, 
according to magnitude, with other quantities of 
the same kind, but for which no algebraic opera-
tions among those quantities exist” (emphasis in 
original).  
 
Note 1 (p. 15) then qualifies the definition in the 
following manner: 
 
Ordinal quantities can enter into empirical rela-
tions only and have neither measurement units 
nor quantity dimensions. Differences and ratios 
of ordinal quantities have no physical meaning. 
(emphasis in original). 
 
A logical inconsistency between the definition and 
its qualification are apparent. In the definition, the 
term “magnitude” is to be used to determine the order 
of quantities of the same kind. As detailed above, a 
quantity is formalised as {N} [U], distinct from other 
references {N} R. From Note 1, it is made clear this 
form of “quantity” has no units. This means such a 
“quantity” can only be expressed as {N}  ; that is, a 
number in the numeric component and a null in the 
reference component. This is a troublesome issue, for 
it means number and quantity are equivalent. To 
express an “ordinal quantity” as {9}   would simply 
mean “9”, and in turn mean number and quantity are 
the same thing. Clearly, numbers and quantities are 
not the same thing. For example, the power of a 
number is expressed as a base and an exponent. If 
numbers and quantities are the same thing, and 
therefore interchangeable, then 22^[cm] , [cm]^[cm] and 
[cm]^9 would all have meaning. As these expressions 
are meaningless, numbers and quantities cannot be 
interchanged and are therefore not the same. Massey 
[10 p 3] made a similar observation when he noted 
that “…if x does have units, to write e^x is 
meaningless." 
Ordinal quantity also has all the attributes of the 
Stevens [11 p. 677] measurement definition, where 
“…we may say that measurement, in the broadest 
sense, is defined as the assignment of numerals to 
objects or events according to rules…” In VIM 
[3 p 15] this is exemplified as “Subjective level of 
abdominal pain on a scale from zero to five.” 
This assignment of numerals fails to discriminate 
between numerals and numbers, and fails to 
discriminate between objects or events and the 
attributes of those objects or events. First, numerals 
are labels, and can be found on mail boxes, street 
names and football jumpers, and like the letter labels 
for academic grades “A”, “B” or “C”, carry no 
information regarding magnitude. As elaborated by 
Michell [8 pp. 177-181], Stevens therefore needed to 
interpret numeral as number. However as 
demonstrated above, real number comes from the 
relationship between a quantity and its special 
reference quantity the unit, such that M / [M] = {M}. 
Number is not assigned as defined by Stevens or the 
VIM [3 p. 15). Second, objects or events are discrete 
entities and are best described as enumerated 
quantities [10]. The Stevens definition and the VIM 
promulgation of “ordinal quantity” fail to account for 
any of these issues. 
Of logical concern, is the assigning of numerals 
and the classical measurement form are a comparator 
for truth. For example, the length of a jetty is discov-
ered through measurement to be 7 metres. It is not the 
jetty that is related to the number 7. It is the magnitude 
of the attribute length of the jetty relative to the metre 
unit that is the number 7. That is, the number 7 is 
predicated on there being an attribute length that is 
reflected in the number of metre units that is 7 which 
describes the attribute length of my jetty (c.f. 8 p 16). 
This may be expressed as {7} [m]:{1} [m] or {7} [m]. 
If the same jetty was to be “assessed” from the point 
of view of “assigning numerals”, or “ordinal quan-
tity”, the following may occur. 
To descriptor categories for jetties that were quali-
tatively different and assumed ordered, numerals 
would be assigned to reflect the assumed order. This 
in itself is troublesome for such numerals are treated 
as numbers and the perceived qualitative difference 
then treated as a quantitative difference. However, say 
by using this procedure the jetty is assigned a “7”. 
This produces a logical distinction between measure-
ment as a discovery of ratios, {7}[m]/[m], and meas-
urement as the assigning of a numeral, “7”. 
The discovery of ratios is a commitment to truth. 
That is, “The jetty is {7} [m] long”, is a proposition 
that can be falsified, a major tenet of science. By 
comparison, the assessed “7”, based on descriptors of 
jetties to which each descriptor has numerals assigned, 
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is not logically possible to falsify. The descriptor 
categories and the numerals by which the assignment 
was made may well be disputed, but this does not 
establish the truth or falsity of the statement; the jetty 
has a quantitative measure and that measure is of a 
magnitude {7} [m]. Measurement based on the ratio 
of two quantities, one of which is the standard of ref-
erence (the unit), is about truth and may be falsified. 
As the procedure of “ordinal quantity” assigns numer-
als (idiosyncratically), no “ordinal quantity” can be 
falsified. We therefore contend “ordinal quantity” is 
not scientific. 
 
5.  COUNTING OF ENTITIES 
 
Berka [9 p 110] has observed there is a distinction 
between the counting of discrete objects and the 
counting of continuous units of quantity; the former is 
not expressive of measurement while the later is 
expressive of measurement. This arises because  
 
…counting determines the number of individual 
objects of a collection and, for this reason, refers 
primarily to discrete entities and individual objects 
and not, however-unlike measurement -to their 
continuous properties. If, with the help of the 
measurement unit, we decompose the measured 
magnitude into a series of individual elements of 
the same size, we might also secondarily apply 
counting to this specific sort of discrete objects 
and regard this operation as an auxiliary compo-
nent of measurement procedures. However, one 
must not infer from this, as a general conclusion, 
that measurement is reducible to counting. 
 
Here Berka has referred to units of continuous 
quantities as the “specific sort of discrete objects.” 
This recognizes that a continuous quantity can only be 
observed as discrete; not that continuous quantity is 
discrete or is made discrete by the use of 
instrumentation to represent it. Therefore, his 
distinction between counting and measuring remains a 
distinction between counting of entities and the 
measuring of continuous quantity, wherein the former 
counting is an ontological requirement and in the later 
counting is an epistemological auxiliary. 
The distinction between counting and measuring 
has been elaborated by Cooper & Humphry [12] in the 
boarder measurement context. In précis, Cooper & 
Humphry argue counting occurs with objects and 
events they call discrete entities and therefore deal 
with natural numbers. Measurement, in the classical 
sense defined above, is the formation of a ratio 
between two expressions of a quantity, one of which is 
called the standard of reference, the unit, and therefore 
deals with real numbers. Therefore, measurement 
does not occur by counting discrete entities. They 
conclude by observing that counting and measuring 
are ontologically distinct; counting involves natural 
numbers and measuring involves real numbers formed 
from the ratio of quantities. 
In the SI [4], the counting of entities measurement 
form [pp 114-115] is a specified number of discrete 
entities exemplified by the unit mole, which is unit of 
“amount of substance”. The mole is defined as 
proportional to the number of specified elementary 
entities in a sample, which is the same for all samples. 
The unit of amount of substance is called the mole, 
and is defined by specifying the mass of carbon 12 
that constitutes one mole of carbon 12 atoms 
[4 pp 114–115]. Two notes are attached to its 
definition: 
 
1. The mole is the amount of substance of a system 
which contains as many elementary entities as 
there are atoms in 0.012 kilogram of carbon 12; its 
symbol is “mol”. 
2. When the mole is used, the elementary entities 
must be specified and may be atoms, molecules, 
ions, electrons, other particles, or specified groups 
of such particles. It follows that the molar mass of 
carbon 12 is exactly 12 grams per mole, M(12C) = 
12 g/mol. 
 
By definition, the mole is a count of entities that 
must be specified (Fig. 3). Although the mole itself is 
divisible, the specified entities of its composition are 
not divisible, for they are entities. Unlike the classical 
measurement form where there is a continuous inverse 
relationship between the numeric and unit component, 
the composition of entities that form the mole will 
ultimately fail to be divisible. Therefore the mole is 
not a continuous quantity as the inverse relationship 
that characterises the classical measurement form does 
not hold. The mole will ultimately cease its inverse 
relationship between its numeric and unit component 
at one entity of its composition. The mole is therefore 
not a continuous unit and is best considered a count of 
discrete entities. 
 
6..DISCUSSION 
 
The differing expressions of quantity now exem-
plified in the international vocabulary of metrology, 
appear to have arisen from a change in the manner of 
defining quantity. Expressing quantity as 
{N}Reference, while not formal, has drawn attention 
to the formal requirement of {N}[U] where only a unit 
may be expressed in a quantity. There appears to be a 
sound reason to place a caveat on {N}[U]. Only 
{N}[U] can form the inverse relationship that makes 
permissible the formation of equivalences. No other 
Reference can achieve this with their respective {N}. 
While ordering attributes and counting entities 
may be worthy means of establishing differences, they 
are not a means of establishing measurement. Meas-
urement, the ratio of two quantities of the same attrib-
ute is to be preserved for quantification of continuous 
quantity and none other.  
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We are currently researching to document the his-
tory of measurement definitions of continuous quan-
tity, ordering, and counting. This research will provide 
theoretical and empirical comparisons and contrasts of 
measurement based in these three contrasting forms. 
This research will be used to describe a framework 
within which the potential of ordering and counting to 
support inferences of continuous quantity may be 
experimentally evaluated. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 
The VIM [5] and SI [6] promulgation of three 
measurement forms belies the stated assumption there 
are no fundamental differences in the basic principles 
of measurement found in industry [5 p vii]. While the 
“…need to cover measurements in chemistry and 
laboratory medicine for the first time… and nominal 
properties” [5 p vii] may well explain why differing 
measurement forms are now defined in metrology, the 
consequence is a blurring of the distinction between 
continuous quantity, ordered relationships and counts 
of entities. 
We suggest the VIM 4th Edition should explicitly 
define differing measurement forms and their limita-
tions. The classical form, where in a ratio of two con-
tinuous quantities of the same type forms a unit [U], 
maintains the inverse relationship between the numer-
ical component of a continuous quantity {N} and its 
unit [U]. No other measurement form does this and 
therefore cannot form systems of coherent units. 
Therefore, removing the relationship between the 
numerical component of a quantity and the “refer-
ence” R, from the VIM [5] measurement definition, 
restores the unit [U] as the only permissible “standard 
of reference” [2 p 1] in a quantity. 
Such a requirement may well be the litmus for dis-
tinguishing between measurement, ordering and 
counting and therefore differentiate measurement from 
these other forms of quantification. 
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